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In recent years a growing consensus has emerged for price stability as the overriding, longrun goal of monetary policy. However, despite this consensus, the following question still remains: how should monetary policy be conducted to achieve the price stability goal? To shed light on this question, this paper examines the experience with different monetary policy regimes currently in use in a number of countries.
A central feature of all of these monetary regimes is the use of a nominal anchor in some form, so first we will examine what role a nominal anchor plays in promoting price stability. Then we will examine four basic types of monetary policy regimes: 1) exchange-rate targeting, 2) monetary targeting, 3) inflation targeting, and 4) monetary policy with an implicit but not an explicit nominal anchor. The basic theme that comes out of this analysis is that the success of different monetary regimes depends on their ability to constrain discretionary policymaking so that long-run price stability is more likely to result.
I.

The Role of a Nominal Anchor
A nominal anchor is a constraint on the value of domestic money, and in some form it is a necessary element in successful monetary policy regimes. Why is a nominal anchor needed? First, from a purely technical viewpoint, a nominal anchor provides conditions that make the price level uniquely determined, which is obviously necessary for price stability. It helps do this by tieing down inflation expectations directly through its constraint on the value of domestic money.
However, a nominal anchor can be thought of more broadly as a constraint on discretionary policy that helps weaken the time-inconsistency problem so that in the long run, price stability is a more likely to be achieved. The time-inconsistency problem arises because discretionary policy at each point in time can lead to poor long-run outcomes. In the case of monetary policy, expansionary monetary policy will produce higher growth and employment in the short-run, and so policymakers have incentives to pursue this policy even though it ends up producing higher inflation, but not higher growth or employment, in the long-run. However, it is important to recognize that the timeinconsistency problem may not reside in the central bank because, as McCallum (1995) points out, a central bank can avoid the time-inconsistency problem by simply recognizing the problem that forward-looking expectations in the wage-and price-setting process creates for a strategy of pursuing expansionary monetary policy. The central bank can just decide not to play that game. However, even so, there will still be pressures on the central bank to pursue overly expansionary monetary policy by the politicians. Thus even if the source of time inconsistency is not within central banks, a nominal anchor which limits political pressures to pursue overly expansionary, monetary policies has an important role to play in the achievement of price stability.
II. Exchange-Rate Targeting
Targeting the exchange rate is a monetary policy regime with a long history. It can take the form of fixing the value of the domestic currency to a commodity such as gold, the key feature of the gold standard. More recently, fixed exchange-rate regimes have involved fixing the value of the domestic currency to that of a large, low-inflation country. Another alternative is adoption of a crawling target or peg in which a currency is allowed to depreciate at a steady rate so that the inflation rate in the pegging country can be higher than that of the anchor country.
Exchange-rate targeting has several advantages. First, the nominal anchor of an exchangerate target fixes the inflation rate for internationally traded goods, and thus directly contributes to keeping inflation under control. Second, if the exchange-rate target is credible, it anchors inflation expectations to the inflation rate in the anchor country to whose currency it is pegged. Third, with a strong commitment mechanism, an exchange-rate target provides an automatic rule for the conduct of monetary policy that helps mitigate the time-inconsistency problem. It forces a tightening of monetary policy when there is a tendency for the domestic currency to depreciate or a loosening of policy when there is a tendency for the domestic currency to appreciate, so that discretionary, timeinconsistent, monetary policy is less of an option. Fourth, an exchange-rate target has the advantage of simplicity and clarity, which make it easily understood by the public. A "sound currency" is an easy-to-understand rallying cry for monetary policy. This has been important in France, for example, where an appeal to the "franc fort" is often used to justify tight monetary policy.
Given its advantages, it is not surprising that exchange-rate targeting has been used successfully to control inflation in industrialized countries. Both France and the United Kingdom, for example, successfully used exchange-rate targeting to lower inflation by tying the value of their currencies to the German mark. In 1987, when France first pegged their exchange rate to the mark, its inflation rate was 3%, two percentage points above the German inflation rate. By 1992 its inflation rate had fallen to 2%, a level that can be argued is consistent with price stability, and was even below that in Germany. By 1996, the French and German inflation rates had converged, to a number slightly below 2%. Similarly, after pegging to the German mark in 1990, the United Kingdom was able to lower its inflation rate from 10% to 3% by 1992, when it was forced to abandon the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM).
Exchange-rate targeting has also been an effective means of reducing inflation quickly in emerging market countries. An important recent example has been Argentina, which in 1991 established a currency board arrangement, requiring the central bank to exchange U.S. dollars for new pesos at a fixed exchange rate of 1 to 1. A currency board is just one form of a fixed-exchange rate regime with an important difference. The currency board makes a much stronger and transparent commitment to an exchange-rate target than the typical fixed-fixed exchange rate regime because it requires that the monetary authority stands ready to exchange the domestic currency for foreign currency at the specified fixed exchange rate whenever the public requests it. In order to credibly meet these requests, a currency board typically has more than 100% foreign reserves backing the domestic currency and allows the monetary authorities absolutely no discretion. The early years of Argentina's currency board looked stunningly successful. Inflation which had been running at over a one-thousand percent annual rate in 1989 and 1990 fell to under 5% by the end of 1994, and economic growth was rapid, averaging almost 8% at an annual rate from 1991 to 1994.
Despite the inherent advantages of exchange-rate targeting, it is not without its serious problems, as the international experience demonstrates. There are several serious criticisms of exchange-rate targeting, which have been articulated brilliantly in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) . First is that, with open capital markets, an exchange-rate target results in the loss of independent monetary policy, since the targeting country loses the ability to use monetary policy to respond to domestic shocks that are independent of those hitting the anchor country. Furthermore, an exchange-rate target means that shocks to the anchor country are directly transmitted to the targeting country because changes in interest rates in the anchor country lead to a corresponding change in interest rates in the targeting country.
A striking example of these problems occurred when Germany reunified in 1990. Concerns about inflationary pressures arising from reunification and the massive fiscal expansion required to rebuild East Germany led to rises in German long-term interest rates until February 1991 and to rises in short-term rates until December 1991. This shock to the anchor country in the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) was transmitted directly to the other countries in the ERM whose currencies were pegged to the mark because their interest rates now rose in tandem with those in Germany. The result was that continuing adherence to the exchange-rate target produced a significant slowing of economic growth and rising unemployment, which is exactly what France experienced when it remained in the ERM and adhered to the exchange-rate peg.
An exchange-rate target has the additional disadvantage that it removes the signal that the foreign exchange market provides about the stance of monetary policy on a daily basis. Under an exchange-rate-target regime, central banks often pursue overly expansionary policies that are not discovered until too late, when a successful speculative attack has gotten underway. The problem of lack of accountability of the central bank under an exchange-rate-target regime is particularly acute in emerging market countries where the balance sheets and actions of the central banks are not as transparent as in developed countries. This can make it harder to ascertain the central bank's policy actions, as occurred in Thailand before the July currency crisis. Although, an exchange-rate peg appears to provide rules for central bank behavior that ameliorate the time-inconsistency problem, it can actually make the time-inconsistency problem more severe because it may make central bank actions less transparent and less accountable. Indeed, an exchange-rate depreciation when the exchange rate is not pegged can provide an early warning signal that monetary policy is overly expansionary, and fear of depreciation can make overly expansionary, time-inconsistent, monetary policy less likely.
A third problem with exchange-rate targets is that they leave countries open to speculative attacks on their currencies. Indeed, one aftermath of German reunification was the foreign exchange crisis of September 1992. As we have seen, the tight monetary policy in Germany resulting from German reunification meant that the countries in the ERM were subjected to a negative demand shock that led to a decline in economic growth and a rise in unemployment. It was certainly feasible for the governments of these countries to keep their exchange rates fixed relative to the mark in these circumstances, but speculators began to question whether these countries' commitment to the exchange rate peg would weaken because these countries would not tolerate the rise in unemployment that would result from keeping interest rates sufficiently high to fend off speculative attacks on their currencies.
At this stage, speculators were in effect presented with one-way bets because the currencies of countries like France, Spain, Sweden, Italy and the United Kingdom could only go in one direction, depreciate against the mark. Selling these currencies thus presented speculators with an attractive profit opportunity with potentially high expected returns, and the result was the speculative attack in September 1992. Only in France was the commitment to the fixed exchange rate strong enough, so that France did not devalue. The governments in the other countries were unwilling to defend their currencies at all costs and so eventually allowed their currencies to fall in value.
The different response of France and the United Kingdom after the September 1992 exchange rate crisis illustrates the potential cost of an exchange-rate target. France, which continued to peg to the mark and thereby was unable to use monetary policy to respond to domestic conditions, found that economic growth remained slow after 1992 and unemployment increased. The United Kingdom, on the other hand, which dropped out of the ERM exchange-rate peg and adopted inflation targeting (discussed later), had much better economic performance: economic growth was higher, the unemployment rate fell, and yet inflation performance was not much worse than France's.
The aftermath of German reunification and the September 1992 exchange rate crisis dramatically illustrate two points: 1) an exchange-rate target does not guarantee that the commitment to the exchange-rate based, monetary policy rule is sufficiently strong to maintain the target, and 2) the cost to economic growth from an exchange-rate regime with its loss of independent monetary policy can be high.
For emerging market countries, it is far less clear that these countries lose much by giving up an independent monetary policy when they target exchange rates. Because many emerging market countries have not developed the political or monetary institutions that result in the ability to use discretionary monetary policy successfully, they may have little to gain from an independent monetary policy, but a lot to lose. Thus, they would be better off by, in effect, adopting the monetary policy of a country like the United States through targeting exchange rates than in pursuing their own independent policy. Indeed, this is one of the reasons that so many emerging market countries have adopted exchange-rate targeting.
Nonetheless, as is emphasized in Mishkin (1998a) , there is an additional disadvantage from an exchange-rate target in emerging market countries that suggests that for them this monetary policy regime is highly dangerous. Exchange-rate targeting in emerging market countries is likely to promote financial fragility and possibly a full-fledged financial crisis that can be highly destructive to the economy.
To see why exchange-rate targets in an emerging market country make a financial crisis more likely, we must first understand what a financial crisis is and why it is so damaging to the economy.
In recent years, an asymmetric information theory of financial crises has been developed which provides a definition of a financial crisis and Mishkin (1991 Mishkin ( , 1996 .] A financial crisis is a nonlinear disruption to financial markets in which asymmetric information problems (adverse selection and moral hazard) become much worse, so that financial markets are unable to efficiently channel funds to economic agents who have the most productive investment opportunities. A financial crisis thus prevents the efficient functioning of financial markets, which therefore leads to a sharp contraction in economic activity.
Because of uncertainty about the future value of the domestic currency, many nonfinancial firms, banks and governments in emerging market countries find it much easier to issue debt if the debt is denominated in foreign currencies. This tendency can be further encouraged by an exchangerate targeting regime which may encourage domestic firms and financial institutions to issue foreign denominated debt. The substantial issuance of foreign denominated debt was a prominent feature of the institutional structure in the Chilean financial markets before the financial crisis in 1982, in Mexico before its financial crisis in 1994 and in East Asian countries before their recent crisis.
With an exchange-rate target regime, depreciation of the currency when it occurs is a highly nonlinear event because it involves a devaluation. In most developed countries a devaluation has Indeed, a devaluation in developed countries can actually stimulate economic activity because it makes the 1 country's goods more competitive internationally, thereby increasing its net exports and hence aggregate demand. Indeed, this was exactly the experience of the United Kingdom after the September 1992 foreignexchange crisis when it was forced to devalue its currency. Its economic performance after the devaluation was substantially better than that of countries which remained in the ERM after 1992. 7 little direct effect on the balance sheets of households, firms and banks because their debts are denominated in domestic currency. This is not true, however, in emerging market countries with 1 their very different institutional structure. With debt contracts denominated in foreign currency as in emerging market countries, when there is a devaluation of the domestic currency, the debt burden of domestic firms increases. On the other hand, since assets are typically denominated in domestic currency, there is no simultaneous increase in the value of firms' assets. The result is a that a devaluation leads to a substantial deterioration in balance sheets and a decline in net worth, both for nonfinancial firms and financial firms which now are unable to collect on their loans to nonfinancial firms.
In addition, a devaluation can lead to a dramatic rise in both actual and expected inflation in emerging market countries because their central banks are unlikely to have deep-rooted credibility of inflation fighters. Indeed Mexican inflation surged to 50% in 1995 after the foreign exchange crisis in 1994 and a similar phenomenon has been occurring in Indonesia. The rise in expected inflation then leads to a sharp rise in interest rates, which because of the short duration of debt contracts leads to huge increases in interest payments by firms, thereby weakening firms' cash flow position and further weakening their balance sheets.
The deterioration of balance sheets, by reducing effective collateral, makes lending less attractive and also increases moral hazard incentives for firms to take on greater risk because they have less to lose if the loans go sour. Because lenders are now subject to much higher risks of losses, and because financial intermdiaries like banks may be less able to lend because of the deterioration in their balance sheets, there is a decline in investment and economic activity. The damage to balance sheets from devaluation in the aftermath of the foreign exchange crisis was a major source of the contraction of the economies of Chile in 1982 , Mexico in 1994 and East Asia in 1997 Another potential danger from an exchange-rate target is that by providing a more stable value of the currency, it might lower perceived risk for foreign investors and thus encourage capital inflows. Although these capital inflows might be channeled into productive investments and thus stimulate growth, they might promote excessive lending, manifested by a lending boom, because domestic financial intermediaries such as banks play a key role in intermediating these capital inflows. With inadequate bank supervision, a common problem in emerging market countries, the likely outcome of a lending boom is substantial loan losses and a deterioration of bank balance sheets. Not only will the deterioration in bank balance sheets lead banks to reduce their lending, but it also damages the economy because it makes a currency crisis more likely, which, as we have seen, can trigger a financial crisis. When a country's banking system is in a weakened condition, a successful speculative attack is more likely because the central bank has less of an option to raise interest rates to defend the currency because doing so may cause the banking system to collapse.
The recent events in East Asia and Mexico, in which the weakness of the banking sector and speculative attack on the currency tipped their economies into full-scale financial crises, illustrate how dangerous exchange-rate targeting can be for emerging market countries. Indeed, the fact that an exchange-rate target in these countries leaves them more prone to financial fragility and financial crises, with potentially catastrophic costs to their economies, suggests that exchange-rate targeting in emerging market countries is highly problematic.
Given the above problems with exchange-rate targeting, when might it make sense? In in countries whose political and monetary institutions are particularly weak and therefore have been experiencing continued bouts of hyperinflation, exchange-rate targeting may be the only way to break inflationary psychology and stabilize the economy. In this situation, exchange-rate targeting is the stabilization policy of last resort. However, we have seen that in emerging market countries exchange-rate targeting regimes are not always transparent, weakening the commitment mechanism and making them more likely to breakdown, often with disastrous consequences. This suggests that if exchange-rate targeting is believed to be the only route possible to stabilize the economy, then an emerging market country is probably best served by going all the way and adopting a currency board in which the commitment to the fixed exchange rate is extremely strong and there is total transparency to monetary policy because the actions of the central bank are automatic. However, as is discussed further in Mishkin (1998a) , a currency board is still a potentially dangerous monetary policy regime which requires important institutional reforms in order to make it viable.
III. Monetary Targeting
In many countries, exchange-rate targeting is not an option because the country (or bloc of countries) is too large or has no obvious country whose currency can serve as the nominal anchor. and the United Kingdom, partially because it was not pursued seriously [Bernanke and Mishkin, 1992] , but also because the relationship between monetary aggregates and goal variables such as inflation or nominal income broke down.)
The key fact about monetary targeting regimes in Germany and Switzerland is that the targeting regimes are very far from a Friedman-type monetary targeting rule in which a monetary aggregate is kept on a constant-growth-rate path and is the primary focus of monetary policy. As Otmar Issing, currently the Chief Economist of the Bundesbank has noted (Issing 1996, p. 120) , "One of the secrets of success of the German policy of money-growth targeting was that ... it often did not feel bound by monetarist orthodoxy as far as its more technical details were concerned."
Monetary targeting in Germany and Switzerland should instead be seen primarily as a method of communicating the strategy of monetary policy that focuses on long-run considerations and the control of inflation.
For a more extensive discussion of the procedures used in German monetary targeting, see Bernanke, 2 Laubach, Mishkin and Posen (1999) and the references therein.
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The calculation of monetary target ranges is a very public exercise. First and foremost, a 2 numerical inflation goal is prominently featured in the setting of target ranges. Then with estimates of potential output growth and velocity trends, a quantity-equation framework is used to back out the target growth rate for the monetary aggregate. Second, monetary targeting, far from being a rigid policy rule, has been quite flexible in practice. The target ranges for money growth are missed on the order of fifty percent of the time, often because the Bundesbank's and the Swiss National Bank's concern about other objectives, including output and exchange rates. Furthermore, the Bundesbank has demonstrated its flexibility by allowing its inflation goal to vary over time, raising it when supply shocks occurred and then letting it converge slowly to the long-run inflation goal quite gradually.
Third, the monetary targeting regimes in both Germany and Switzerland have demonstrated a strong commitment to the communication of the strategy to the general public. The money-growth targets are continually used as a framework for explanation of the monetary policy strategy and both the Bundesbank and the Swiss National Bank expend tremendous effort, both in their publications and in frequent speeches by central bank officials, to communicate to the public what the central bank is trying to achieve. Indeed, given that both central banks frequently miss their money-growth targets by significant amounts, their monetary-targeting frameworks are best viewed as a mechanism for transparently communicating how monetary policy is being directed to achieve their inflation goals and as a means for increasing the accountability of the central bank.
Germany's monetary-targeting regime has been quite successful in producing low inflation and its success has been envied by many other countries, explaining why it was chosen as the anchor country for the Exchange Rate Mechanism. An important success story, discussed extensively in Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin and Posen (1999) , occurred in the aftermath of German reunification in 1990. Despite a temporary surge in inflation stemming from the terms of reunification, high wage demands and the fiscal expansion, the Bundesbank was able to keep these one-off effects from becoming embedded in the inflation process, and by 1995, inflation fell back down below the Bundesbank's normative inflation goal of 2%.
One potentially serious criticism of German monetary targeting, however, is that, as demonstrated by Clarida and Gertler (1997) , the Bundesbank has reacted asymmetrically to target misses, raising interest rates in response to overshooting of the money-growth target, but choosing not to lower interest rates in response to an undershooting. This suggests that the Bundesbank may not be sufficiently concerned about undershoots of its normative inflation goal. Arguably this might have caused the Bundesbank to be overly tight in its monetary policy stance in the mid 1990s when German inflation fell below the 2% normative goal, which not only led to an unnecessary increase in unemployment in Germany, but also in countries tied to the deutsche mark, such as France. Bank} failed to maintain price stability after it successfully reduced inflation," (Rich 1997, p. 115, emphasis in original) . The substantial overshoot of inflation from 1989 to 1992, reaching levels above 5%, was due to two factors. The first is that the strength of the Swiss franc from 1985 to 1987 caused the Swiss National Bank to allow the monetary base to grow at a rate greater than the 2% target in 1987 and then raised the money-growth target to 3% for 1988. The second arose from the introduction of a new interbank payment system, the Swiss Interbank Clearing (SIC) and a wideranging revision of the commercial banks' liquidity requirements in 1988. The result of the shocks to the exchange rate and the shift in the demand for monetary base arising from the above institutional changes created a serious problem for its targeted aggregate. As the 1988 year unfolded, it became clear that the Swiss National Bank had guessed wrong in predicting the effects of these shocks so that the demand for monetary base fell by more than the predicted amount, resulting in monetary policy that was too easy even though the monetary target was undershot. The result was a subsequent rise in inflation to above the 5% level.
The result of these problems with monetary targeting has resulted in a substantially loosening of the monetary targeting regime in Switzerland. The Swiss National Bank recognized that its money-growth targets were of diminished utility as a means of signaling the direction of monetary policy. As a result, its announcement at the end of 1990 of the medium-term growth path of was quite ambiguous because it did not specify a horizon for the target or the starting point of the growth path. Eventually the Bank specified the time horizon of the horizon was a period of three to five years and it was not till the end of 1992 that the Bank specified the basis of the starting point for the expansion path. Finally at the end of 1994, the Bank announced a new medium-term path for money base growth for the period 1995 to 1999, thus retroactively revealing that the horizon of the first path was also five years. Clearly, the Swiss National Bank has moved to a much more flexible framework in which hitting one-year targets for money base growth has been abandoned. Nevertheless, Swiss monetary policy has continued to be successful in controlling inflation, with inflation rates falling back down below the 1% level after the temporary bulge in inflation from 1989-1992. There are two key lessons our discussion of German and Swiss monetary targeting. First, a targeting regime can restrain inflation in the longer run, even when the regime permits substantial target misses. Thus adherence to a rigid policy rule has not been found to be necessary to obtain good inflation outcomes. Second, the key reason why monetary targeting has been reasonably successful in these two countries, despite frequent target misses, is that the objectives of monetary policy are clearly stated and both the Bundesbank and the Swiss National Bank actively engage in communicating the strategy of monetary policy to the public, thereby enhancing transparency of monetary policy and accountability of the central bank.
As we will see in the next section, these key elements of a successful targeting regime --flexibility, transparency and accountability -are also important elements in inflation-targeting regimes. Thus, as suggested by Bernanke and Mishkin (1997) , German and Swiss monetary policy is actually closer in practice to inflation targeting than it is to Friedman-like monetary targeting, and thus might best be thought of as "hybrid" inflation targeting.
IV. Inflation Targeting
Given Despite the rhetoric about pursuing "price stability", in practice all the inflation-targeting countries have chosen to target the inflation rate rather than the level of prices per se. In addition, all the inflation targeters have chosen midpoints for their inflation target to be substantially above zero, and above reasonable estimates of possible upward measurement bias in the inflation rates calculated from consumer price indices. For example, currently New Zealand has the lowest midpoint for an inflation target, 1.5%, while Canada and Sweden set the midpoint of their inflation target at 2%; the United Kingdom, Australia and Spain currently have their midpoints at 2.5%, while Israel is at 8.5%. It is important to note that even Germany, considered to be one of the most resolute opponents of inflation in the world, sets its long-run inflation goal at 2% for many years (changed to 1.5 to 2% in December 1996), right in the middle of the pack for inflation targeters.
The decision by inflation targeters (and hybrid targeters like Germany) to choose inflation targets well above zero and not price level targets reflects monetary policymakers concerns that too low inflation, or particularly low inflation, can have substantial negative effects on real economic activity. There are particularly valid reasons for fearing deflation, including the possibility that it might promote financial instability and precipitate a severe economic contraction (see Mishkin, 1991 and . Indeed, deflation has been associated with deep recessions or even depressions, as in the 1930s, and the recent deflation in Japan has been one factor that has weakened the financial system and the economy. Targeting inflation rates of above zero makes periods of deflation less likely. The evidence on inflation expectations from surveys and interest rate levels (Almeida and Goodhart, 1998, and Bernanke, Laubach, Posen and Mishkin, 1999) suggest that maintaining a target for inflation above zero (but not too far above) for an extended period does not lead to instability in inflation expectations or to a decline in the central bank's credibility.
Another key feature of inflation-targeting regimes is that they do not ignore traditional stabilization goals. Central bankers responsible in inflation-targeting countries continue to express their concern about fluctuations in output and employment, and the ability to accommodate short-run stabilization goals to some degree is built into all inflation-targeting regimes. All inflation-targeting countries have been willing to take a gradualist approach to disinflation in order to minimize output declines by lowering medium-term inflation targets towards the long-run goal slowly over time.
In addition, many inflation targeters, particularly the Bank of Canada, have emphasized that the floor of the target range should be emphasized every bit as much as the ceiling, thus helping to stabilize the real economy when there are negative aggregate demand shocks. Indeed, inflation targets can increase the flexibility of the central bank to respond to declines in aggregate spending, because declines in aggregate demand that cause the inflation rate to fall below the floor of the target range will automatically stimulate the central bank to loosen monetary policy without fearing that its action will trigger a rise in inflation expectations.
Another element of flexibility in inflation-targeting regimes is that deviations from inflation targets are routinely allowed in response to supply shocks. First, the price index on which the official inflation targets are based is often defined to exclude or moderate the effects of "supply shocks;" for example, the officially targeted price index may exclude some combination of food and energy prices, indirect tax changes, terms-of-trade shocks, and the direct effects of interest rate changes on the index (for example, through imputed rental costs). Second, following (or in anticipation) of a supply shock, such as a rise in the value-added tax, the normal procedure is for the central bank first to deviate from its planned policies as needed and then to explain the reasons for its action to the public. New Zealand, on the other hand, has an explicit escape clause in its targeting regime which the central bank uses to justify such actions, although it has also permitted target deviations on a more ad hoc basis.
Inflation-targeting regimes also put great stress making policy transparent --policy that is clear, simple, and understandable --and on regular communication with the public. The central banks have frequent communications with the government, some mandated by law and some in response to informal inquiries, and their officials take every opportunity to make public speeches on their monetary policy strategy. These channels are also commonly used in countries that have not adopted inflation targeting, Germany and the United States being prominent examples, but inflationtargeting central banks have taken public outreach a step further: not only have they engaged in extended public information campaigns, even engaging in the distribution of glossy brochures, but they have engaged in publication of Inflation Report type documents (originated by the Bank of England).
The publication of Inflation Reports is particularly noteworthy because these documents depart from the usual, dull-looking, formal reports of central banks to take on the best elements of textbook writing (fancy graphics, use of boxes) in order to better communicate with the public. An excellent description of the shift in emphasis in these reports is reflected in the following quote from the Bank of Canada.
The new Monetary Policy Report will be designed to bring increased transparency and accountability to monetary policy. It will measure our performance in terms of the Bank's targets for controlling inflation and will examine how current economic circumstances and monetary conditions in Canada are likely to affect future inflation. considerations. An important benefit of an inflation-targeting regime is therefore that it makes it more palatable to have an independent central bank which focuses on long-run objectives, but which is consistent with a democratic society because it is accountable.
The performance of inflation-targeting regimes has been quite good. Inflation-targeting countries seem to have significantly reduced both the rate of inflation and inflation expectations beyond that which would likely have occurred in the absence of inflation targets. Furthermore, once inflation is down, it has stayed down; following disinflations, the inflation rate in targeting countries has not bounced back up during subsequent cyclical expansions of the economy.
Also inflation targeting seems to ameliorate the effects of inflationary shocks. For example, shortly after adopting inflation targets in February 1991, the Bank of Canada was faced with a new goods and services tax (GST) --an indirect tax similar to a value-added tax --an adverse supply shock that in earlier periods might have led to a ratcheting up in inflation. Instead the tax increase led to only a one-time increase in the price level; it did not generate second-and third-round rises in wages in prices that would led to a persistent rise in the inflation rate. Another example is the experience of the United Kingdom and Sweden following their departures from the ERM exchangerate pegs in 1992. In both cases, devaluation would normally have stimulated inflation because of the direct effects on higher export and import prices and the subsequent effects on wage demands and price-setting behavior. Again it seems reasonable to attribute the lack of inflationary response in these episodes to adoption of inflation targeting, which short-circuited the second-and later-round effects and helped to focus public attention on the temporary nature of the devaluation shocks.
Indeed, one reason why inflation targets were adopted in both countries was to achieve exactly this result.
Although inflation targeting does appear to be successful in moderating and controlling inflation, it is not without potential problems. In contrast to exchange-rate and monetary targeting, inflation is not easily controlled by the monetary authorities. This can be a particularly severe problem for an emerging market country that is trying to bring down inflation from a previously high level and so is more likely to experience large inflation forecast errors. This suggests that hard targets from inflation might be worth phasing in only after there has been some successful disinflation. This is exactly the strategy followed by Chile (see Morande and Schmidt-Hebbel, 1997) which adopted a weak form of inflation targeting in September 1990. Initially, inflation targets were announced and interpreted as official inflation projections, rather than as hard targets. However, over time as inflation fell, this procedure was changed and inflation targets came to be viewed by the central bank and the markets as hard targets. Waiting to harden targets until after some success has already been achieved on the inflation front, is also consistent with what inflation-targeting industrialized countries have done: in every case, inflation targeting was not implemented until after substantial disinflation has previously been achieved (see Posen, 1997, and Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin and Posen, 1999) .
Another potential problem with inflation targeting is that, because of the long lags of monetary policy, inflation outcomes are revealed only after a substantial lag; thus inflation targeting does not provide immediate signals to both the public and the markets about the stance of monetary policy. However, we have seen that exchange-rate targets remove the ability of the foreign exchange market to signal that overly expansionary monetary policies might be in place, while the signals provided by monetary aggregates are unlikely to be very strong because of the instability of the relationship between money and inflation.
It is also important to recognize that the likely effects of inflation targeting on the real side Some economists have proposed that central banks should target the growth rate of nominal GDP rather 3 than inflation because of concerns that targeting inflation might produce excessive output fluctuations. Because nominal GDP targeting has up to now not been adopted anywhere in the world, I will discuss it only briefly here. Relative to inflation, nominal GDP growth has the advantage that it does put some weight on output as well as prices in the policymaking process. With a nominal GDP target, a decline in projected real output growth would automatically imply an increase in the central banks inflation target, which would tend to be stabilizing because it would automatically lead to an easier monetary policy.
Nominal GDP targeting is close in spirit to inflation targeting and might provide a reasonable alternative. The most important reason why I believe that inflation targeting has advantages over nominal GDP targeting (other reasons are outlined in Mishkin (1998b) is that a nominal GDP target forces the central bank or the government to announce a number for potential GDP growth. Such an announcement is highly problematic because estimates of potential GDP growth are far from precise and change over time. Announcing a specific number for potential GDP growth may thus indicate a certainty that policymakers may not have and may also cause the public to mistakenly believe that this estimate is actually a fixed target for potential GDP growth. Announcing a potential GDP growth number is likely to be political dynamite because it opens policymakers to the criticism that they are willing to settle for growth rates that the public many consider to be too low. Indeed, a nominal GDP target may lead to an accusation that the central bank or the targeting regime is anti-growth, when the opposite is true because a low inflation rate is a means to promote a healthy economy with high growth. In addition, if the estimate for potential GDP growth 21 of the economy are more ambiguous. Economic theorizing often suggests that a commitment by a central bank to reduce and control inflation should improve its credibility and thereby reduce both inflation expectations and the output losses associated with disinflation. Experience and econometric evidence (e.g., see Almeida and Goodhart, 1998, and Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin and Posen, 1999) does not support this prediction, however. Inflation expectations do not immediately adjust downward following the adoption of inflation targeting. Furthermore, there appears to be little if any reduction in the output loss associated with disinflation, the sacrifice ratio, among countries adopting inflation targeting.
A common concern raised about inflation targeting is that it will lead to low and unstable growth in output and employment. Although inflation reduction is associated with below-normal output during disinflationary phases in inflation-targeting regimes, once low inflation levels have been achieved, output and employment return to levels at least as high as they were previously. A conservative conclusion is that, once, low inflation is achieved, inflation targeting is not harmful to the real economy. Given the strong economic growth after disinflation was achieved in many countries that have adopted inflation targets, New Zealand being one outstanding example, a case can even be made that inflation targeting promotes real economic growth in addition to controlling inflation.
is too high and becomes embedded in the public mind as a target, it can lead to a positive inflation bias. Also, as argued above, inflation targeting as it is actually practiced allows considerable flexibility for policy in the short run. Thus it is doubtful that, in practice, nominal GDP targeting would be more effective than inflation targeting in achieving short-run stabilization, and elements of monetary policy tactics based on nominal GDP targeting could easily be built into an inflation-targeting regime.
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Some economists, such as Friedman and Kuttner (1996) , have criticized inflation targeting because they believe that it imposes a rigid rule on monetary policymakers that does not allow them enough discretion to respond to unforeseen circumstances. This criticism is one that has featured prominently in the rules-versus-discretion debate. For example, policymakers in countries that adopted monetary targeting did not foresee the breakdown of the relationship between these aggregates and goal variables such as nominal spending or inflation. With rigid adherence to a monetary rule, the breakdown in their relationship could have been disastrous. However, the interpretation of inflation targeting as a rule is incorrect and stems from a confusion that has been created by the rules-versus-discretion debate. In my view, the traditional dichotomy between rules and discretion can be highly misleading. Useful policy strategies exist that are "rule-like" in that they involve forward-looking behavior which constrains policymakers from systematically engaging in policies with undesirable long-run consequences, thereby avoiding the time-inconsistency problem.
These policies would best be described as "constrained discretion." Indeed, inflation targeting can be described exactly in this way. As emphasized above, However, despite its flexibility, inflation targeting is not an exercise in policy discretion as subject to the time-inconsistency problem. The strategy of hitting an inflation target, by its very nature, forces policymakers to be forward looking rather than narrowly focused on current economic conditions. Further, through its transparency, an inflation-targeting regime increases the central bank's accountability, which constrains discretion so that the time-inconsistency problem is ameliorated.
V. Monetary Policy With an Implicit But not an Explicit Nominal Anchor
Several countries in recent years, most notably the United States, have achieved excellent macroeconomic performance (including low and stable inflation) without using an explicit nominal anchor such as a target for the exchange rate, a monetary aggregate target, or inflation. Although in the U.S. case, no explicit strategy has been articulated, a coherent strategy for the conduct of monetary policy exists nonetheless. This strategy involves an implicit, but not an explicit nominal anchor in the form of an overriding concern by the Federal Reserve to control inflation in the long run. In addition it involves forward-looking behavior in which there is careful monitoring for signs of future inflation, coupled with periodic "preemptive strikes" by monetary policy against the threat of inflation.
The presence of long lags means that monetary policy can not wait until inflation has already reared its ugly head before responding. If the central bank waited until overt signs of inflation appeared, it would already be too late to maintain stable prices, at least not without a severe tightening of policy: inflation expectations would already be embedded in the wage-and pricesetting process, creating an inflation momentum that will be hard to halt. Indeed, inflation becomes much harder to control once it has been allowed to gather momentum because higher inflation expectations become ingrained in various types of contracts and pricing agreements.
In order to prevent inflation from getting started, monetary policy therefore needs to be forward-looking and preemptive: that is, depending on the lags from monetary policy to inflation, monetary policy needs to act well before inflationary pressures appear in the economy. For example, if it takes roughly two years for monetary policy to have a significant impact on inflation, then, even if inflation is quiescent currently and yet, with an unchanged stance of monetary policy, policymakers see inflation rising over the next two years, actions need to be taken today to tighten monetary policy to prevent the inflationary surge.
This preemptive monetary policy strategy is clearly also a feature of inflation-targeting regimes because monetary policy instruments are adjusted to take account of the long lags in their effects in order to hit future inflation targets. However, the policy regime in the United States, which does not have a nominal anchor and so might best be described as a "just do it" policy regime, differs from inflation targeting in that it does not officially have a nominal anchor and is much less transparent in its monetary policy strategy.
The main argument for the "just do it" strategy is, simply its demonstrated success. The Federal Reserve has been able to bring down inflation in the United States from double digit levels in 1980 to around the 3% level by the end of 1991; since then, inflation has been stable at about that level or a bit below it. The Fed conducted a successful preemptive strike against inflation from February 1994 until early 1995, when in several steps it raised the federal funds rate for 3% to 6% even though inflation was not increasing during this period. The subsequent lengthy expansion has brought unemployment down below 5%, a level not seen since the 1960s, and despite the business expansion, CPI inflation actually has even fallen to a level near 2%. In addition, the overall growth rate of the U.S. has continued to remain strong. Indeed, the performance of the U.S. economy has become the envy of the industrialized world in the 1990s. Given the success of the "just do it" strategy, a natural question to ask is why countries such as the United States should consider other monetary policy strategies which would change something that has already worked well, especially given the inability to know what types of challenges will confront monetary policy in the future: In other words, "If it ain't broke, why fix it?" The answer is that the "just do it" strategy has some disadvantages that may cause it to work less well in the future.
An important disadvantage of the "just do it" strategy is a lack of transparency. The constant guessing game about the Fed's intentions created by its close-mouthed approach creates unnecessary volatility in financial markets and arouses uncertainty among producers and the general public about the future course of inflation and output as well. Furthermore, the opacity of its policymaking is hardly conducive to making the Federal Reserve accountable to Congress and the general public, because there are no predetermined criteria for judging its performance.
As a result, the central bank is more susceptible to the time-inconsistency problem, whereby it may pursue short-term objectives at the expense of long-term ones.
The lack of an explicit nominal anchor is also a potential problem for the "just do it" strategy:
For example, it may be that the Fed risks greater exposure than is necessary to "inflation scares" --the spontaneous increases in inflation fears described by Goodfriend (1993) that can become selfjustifying if accommodated by the Fed. In addition, this strategy may make it harder for the Fed to contain the medium-term effects of a supply shock because the absence of a nominal anchor makes inflation expectations more susceptible to rise in the face when this occurs.
Probably the most serious problem with the "just do it" approach is strong dependence on the preferences, skills, and trustworthiness of the individuals in charge of the central bank. In the United Sates, Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan and other Federal Reserve officials have emphasized forward-looking policies and inflation control, with great success so far. The Fed's prestige and credibility with the public have risen accordingly. But the Fed's leadership will eventually change, and there is no guarantee that the new team will be committed to the same approach. Nor is there any guarantee that the relatively good working relationship now existing between the Fed and the executive branches will continue. In a different economic or political environment, the Fed might face strong pressure to engage in over expansionary policies, raising the possibility that time-inconsistency may become a more serious problem. In the past, after a successful period of low inflation, the Federal Reserve has reverted to inflationary monetary policy --the 1970s are one example --and without an explicit nominal anchor, this could certainly happen again in the future.
The political problem with the U.S. regime in which there is no explicit nominal anchor is illustrated by events during the spring of 1997. At that time, following several previous reductions of the federal funds rate, the Federal Reserve reversed its policy and hiked the target for the funds rate by 25 basis points (one-quarter of a percentage point). Although that rise was quite modest, particularly given the strong growth of the U.S. economy and the tight labor market at the time, it provoked a storm of criticism, in Congress and elsewhere. Yet at about the same time, increases in interest rates engineered by the Bank of England, an established inflation targeter, were received Note that countries might find it useful to target exchange rates for reasons which have little to do with the 4 conduct of monetary policy, such as encouraging integration of the domestic economy with its neighbors. Clearly this is the rationale for long-standing pegging of the exchange rate to the deutsche mark by countries such as Austria and the Netherlands, and the more recent exchange-rate pegs in the run-up to the European Monetary Union. (However, if economic integration is the goal, it is more likely to be accomplished by currency union rather than an exchange-rate peg.) 26 quite calmly by the British public. Because of inflation targeting, it is plausible that the British public had a better understanding of the long-run objectives being pursued by the monetary authorities, and hence of the reason for their policy action, than the U.S. public. The absence of an explicit nominal anchor and the accompanying transparency, may thus make it harder for the Federal Reserve to contain inflation in the future if undesirable shocks begin to propel inflation upward.
VI. An Overall Assessment of the Different Monetary Regimes
In examining international experiences with different monetary policy regimes, we have looked at four basic types of frameworks: 1) exchange-rate targeting, 2) monetary targeting, 3) inflation targeting, and 4) monetary policy with an implicit but not an explicit nominal anchor. How do these different monetary policy regimes stack up against each other? When might one monetary regime be more effective in producing desirable economic outcomes than another?
Our discussion of exchange-rate targeting suggests that as a strategy for stabilizing the economy and controlling inflation, the disadvantages typically outweigh the advantages, particularly when exchange-rate targets promote financial instability as in emerging market countries. However, if a country does not have political, economic and cultural institutions that allow them to conduct their own monetary policy successfully, then a transparent form of exchange-rate targeting, such as a currency board, might have enough benefits to outweigh the potential costs. 4 The second monetary policy regime discussed here has worked well in a country like Germany and is a key reason why the Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB) announced in October, 1998 , that a component of its monetary policy strategy is "a prominent role for money with a reference value for the growth of a monetary aggregate." However, our earlier discussion suggests several reasons why monetary targeting by the ECB may not be a very good idea.
First, monetary aggregates are not a particularly useful guide for monetary policy unless the relationship between monetary aggregates and inflation is strong and reliable. A stable relationship between money and inflation is, in fact, quite unlikely to exist in the fledgling EMU, since this relationship has not been particularly reliable in the past in most of the constituent countries of the Union, including even Germany (Estrella and Mishkin, 1996) . The Bundesbank has not been unaware of the instability of the money-inflation relationship, which helps to explain why it has been willing to tolerate misses of its money-growth targets in half of the years for which the targets have been set. Furthermore, the creation of the European Monetary Union and the European System of Central Banks at the start of Stage Three, together with ongoing financial deregulation and innovation, will cause major change in the operation of the European financial system in coming years. Those changes will affect money and asset demands in unpredictable ways, making it likely that the relationship between monetary aggregates and inflation in the Union as a whole will be even more unstable than it has been in the individual member countries.
The second objection to the adoption of monetary targeting by the European Monetary Union is that monetary targets are likely to prove a less effective vehicle of communication for the EMU than they have for Germany and Switzerland. Despite frequent target misses, both the Bundesbank and the Swiss National Bank are held in such high regard that they lose little by using the announcement of monetary targets as the framework in which they explain their policy strategy, despite the fact that their actual inflation targeting leads them to miss their stated monetary targets so frequently. The European Central Bank, which will be starting from scratch, will not at the outset command the credibility and anti-inflation reputation of the Bundesbank and the Swiss National Bank, which are based primarily on strong political support for low inflation in those two countries and on the demonstrated success of the two central banks in fighting inflation. Missing announced targets for money growth may thus be far more problematic for the European Central Bank than it was for the Bundesbank and the Swiss National Bank, because the public will be less willing to accept the European Central Bank's explanations for these misses and declarations of antiinflationary determination at face value. Furthermore, in many European countries the public will have no experience with a monetary policy focused on monetary aggregates, and thus may find the targets harder to understand and less relevant to their daily lives than targets for inflation.
Inflation targeting, which is the newest of the monetary regimes studied here, has been gaining popularity in recent years and has several major strengths. It enables monetary policy to focus on domestic considerations as does monetary targeting, but is not subject to velocity shock problems; it is readily understood and highly transparent; it allows flexibility and discretion in the conduct of monetary policy, but because it increases the accountability of the central bank it constrains discretion so that the time-inconsistency problem is ameliorated; and it helps shift the public debate to a focus what monetary policy can do in the long run and thus helps reduce political pressure to engage in time-inconsistent policies. The performance of inflation-targeting countries has been very good up to now, enabling them to do quite well in hitting their targets and maintain low inflation rates, something they have not always been able to do in the past, while it seems to improve the climate for economic growth after the initial disinflation phase is past. However, inflation targeting is no panacea: it does not seem to enable countries to eliminate inflation from their systems without cost, and anti-inflation credibility is not achieved immediately upon the adoption of an inflation target. The evidence seems to suggest that the only way for an inflationtargeting central bank to earn credibility is the hard way: they have to earn it.
In addition to "reference values" for monetary aggregates, the announced strategy of the European Central Bank also includes a numerically explicit inflation goal of a year-on-year increase of below 2%. Because the signals from monetary aggregates are even more likely to be weak when the European Monetary Union comes into existence and a key element of any successful targeting strategy is transparency and effective communication with the public, the European Central Bank is likely to be better served by downgrading the attention to monetary aggregates and putting inflation targets at the forefront instead.
But what about the need of the European Central Bank to inherit the mantle of the Bundesbank, a monetary targeter of long standing? Doesn't this suggest that the European Central Bank should adopt monetary targeting in order to provide continuity with the policies of the Bundesbank, thereby inheriting the Bundesbank's credibility? There are indeed benefits for the European Central Bank to be seen as following in the footsteps of the Bundesbank. However, we have seen that the Bundesbank's policy framework is actually quite close to inflation targeting. Both frameworks have many characteristics in common, including: a strong commitment to price stability; the specification of numerical inflation goals (both in the medium term and the long term); accountability of the central bank for meeting the goals; transparency of policy and effective communication with the public; a forward-looking approach that takes into account the lags inherent in monetary policy; and flexibility to respond to short-run economic developments. In short, in practice an inflation-targeting European Central Bank would function very much like the monetary targeting Bundesbank, and the public could be actively educated to understand this basic continuity.
The differences that exist --notably, the deemphasis on money growth as the key piece of information for forecasting inflation --favor the inflation-targeting approach.
The final monetary regime discussed in this paper is the "just do it" approach followed by the United States in which there is an implicit, but not an explicit nominal anchor. The key argument for this approach is that it has worked in the past and so "if it ain't broke, why fix it?. However, the "just do it" strategy suffers from a lack of transparency and accountability of the central bank, which not only may weaken the support for anti-inflationary monetary policy but also is not fully consistent with democratic principles (see Mishkin, forthcoming) . Also replacement of the "just do it" with an inflation-targeting approach would help to depersonalize U.S. monetary policy, which would strengthen the central bank's commitment to the long-run goal of price stability and make the achievement of low inflation less dependent on the competence or convictions of a few individuals.
It seems likely that U.S. monetary policy performance in the future could be improved by the adoption of inflation targeting. Inflation targeting is not too far from the current policymaking philosophy at the Federal Reserve, which has stressed the importance of price stability as the overriding, long-run goal of monetary policy. Also a move to inflation targeting is consistent with recent steps by the Fed to increase the transparency of monetary policy, such as shortening the time before the minutes of the FOMC meeting are released and the practice of announcing the FOMC's decision about whether to change the target for the federal funds rates immediately after the conclusion of the FOMC meeting. The current conditions for adoption of inflation targeting are propitious: inflation has been low and stable for over five years; the public sees that the benefit of a low inflation environment which has helped produce a balanced, long-lived economic expansion; and the success of inflation targeting regimes in other industrialized countries is becoming 30 increasingly apparent. Moving to a more explicit nominal anchor, as with an inflation targeting regime, can help lock in the low and stable inflation rate that the United States is currently experiencing, promoting a more stable and successful monetary policy regime in the future.
VII. Conclusions
This overview of the international experiences with different monetary policy regimes suggests that transparency and accountability are crucial to constraining discretionary monetary policy so that it produces desirable long-run outcomes. Because the devil is in the details in achieving transparency and accountability, what strategy will work best in a country depends on its political, cultural and economic institutions and its past history. The discussion here of the different international experiences with monetary policy strategies will hopefully help provide guidance for policymakers in particular countries as to which monetary policy strategy is more likely to produce low inflation, a stable economic environment, and a healthy economy.
